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Petitioner/Appellant

Kennecott

Corporation

("Kenne-

cott") , pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, hereby replies to the briefs of the State Tax Commission of Utah ("Commission") and Salt Lake County ("County").
I.

NEITHER THE COMMISSION NOR THE COUNTY REFUTE THE
FACT THAT KENNECOTT7S PROPERTY WAS NOT VALUED
USING THE CAPITALIZED NET REVENUE METHOD IN 1988.
The Commission's brief states that "the Tax Commission

values mining property under the capitalized net revenue method
and the summation method but uses the higher of the two methods
for assessment purposes."

Brief of Commission at 10.

The Coun-

ty's brief, citing Kennecott's brief and the Hearing Transcript,
acknowledges that because the capitalized net revenue method
resulted in a lower assessment, "the value placed on the property
for

assessment

assets.'"

purposes was

the

Brief of County at 8.

'summation

of

the

physical

Therefore, both the Commission

and the County concede, as Kennecott has demonstrated, that the

1

The County's brief contains an unsupported statement that
Mr. Eyre's testimony at the hearing
"does not establish, as
Kennecott asserts, that the property was not assessed utilizing
the capitalized net revenue method." Brief of County at 9. The
County implies that since the capitalized net revenue method was
calculated and then discarded as being insufficient, it was still
used. This is a meaningless point. The value of Kennecott's
property was not arrived at by the application of the capitalized
net revenue method.
-1-

summation method was used to value Kennecott's property in 1988
because its application resulted in a higher value than the capitalized net revenue method.
Use of the summation method instead of the capitalized
net revenue method is significant because the Tax Commissions'
decision was based upon the false conclusion that Kennecott was
valued using the capitalized net revenue method.

In its findings

of fact, the Commission stated:
13. The assessment of Kennecott was not
made by using either the comparable sales
method or the cost appraisal method, but was
made by using the capitalized net revenue
method. (emphasis added)
14. The capitalized net revenue method
calculates fair market value without any consideration to transactional costs, i.e., it
assumes that the fair market value is available to the owner without incurring transactional costs.
In its conclusions of law, the Commission stated:
8.
The Legislature has made a determination that when fair market value is calculated by using either the comparable sales
method or the cost appraisal method there are
transaction costs which have been included as
part of the determined value. The Legislature has also made the determination that
when fair market value is calculated by any
other method, such as the capitalized net
revenue method, there are no transaction
costs which have been included as part of the
determined value.
(emphasis added)
mined

9.
. . . The Legislature has deterthat centrally assessed properties,
-2-

including mine properties such as Petitioner/ s # are to be assessed by the Commission
using methods other than the comparable sales
method or the cost appraisal method. Those
centrally assessed property valuation methods, including the capitalized net revenue
method, have been determined to not include
transaction costs in the calculation of fair
market value.
The Legislature has, therefore , specifically excluded properties such
as that which is owned by the Petitioner from
the operation of § 59-2-304 because of the
difference in methodology. (emphasis added)
Thus, the Commission's decision was based on the conclusion that Kennecott's property was valued using the capitalized net revenue method and not the cost appraisal or market
method.

This aspect of the Commission's decision simply misrep-

resents the facts.

The evidence establishes that Kennecott's

property was valued by the Commission using the summation method
which consisted solely of standard cost and market methods.

See

Brief of Petitioner at 17-19.
II.

THE COMMISSION USED THE SAME STANDARD METHODS
USED BY THE COUNTY TO VALUE KENNECOTT'S
PROPERTY.
Both the Commission and the County unequivocally state

that the evidence at the formal hearing "overwhelmingly" supports
the

position

that

the methods

-3-

used

by

the

County

and

the

Commission are not the same.

However, the only identified dis-

tinction between the methods used by the Commission to value Kennecott/s property in 1988 and methods employed by the County is
the County's assertion that if it were valuing Kennecott's land
using the summation method, it would value the minerals located
within Kennecott's property either by using comparable sales or
by making adjustments to comparable sales of non-mining property
to reflect mineral values.

See Brief of Commission, p. 13, cit-

ing Transcript at p. 101-02.
This alleged distinction does not rise to the level of
a different valuation method; rather, it is only a different
application of the standard market method employed by county and
state assessors.

Additionally, neither the County nor the Com-

mission asserts that the application of the cost method used by
the Commission to value Kennecott's property, i.e., the replacement cost new less depreciation method, is not identical to the
method routinely used by the County.

See Brief of Petitioner at

20-27.

2

Both the Commission and the County claim that Kennecott did
not adequately marshal the evidence to show that the methods used
by the Commission and County were the same. See, Brief of Commission, p. 6; Brief of County, p. 6. Kennecott's brief, however, cites extensively from the record to show that the methods
used by the respective agencies were the same.
See, Brief of
Petitioner, pp. 15-27.
-4-

Consequently, this Court's analysis in Amax Magnesium
Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah
1990), is controlling.

In Amax, the Utah Supreme Court deter-

mined that the cost appraisal method used by state assessors "did
not differ in basic theory from the cost appraisal method used by
county assessors."

Id. at 1261.

Consequently, the court stated:

It strains reason to assert that if
assessors using the cost and market appraisal
methods overvalue county properties, the same
overvaluation would not occur with state
properties appraised by the same methods.
Assuming that the legislature was correct in
determining that the market value appraisal
method overvalues property by 20 percent, it
would be unconstitutional to apply [the 20%
Statute] to county-assessed properties and
not to state-assessed properties.
Applying
[the 20% Statute] to the facts of this case,
we hold that it would be in violation of the
constitutional mandate of article XIII, sections 2 and 3 that all property be taxed in a
uniform and equal manner if [the 20% Statute]
is not applied to Amax's property.
Id. at 1260.

Further, the court stated:

If county properties assessed by the cost
appraisal method receive a 20 percent reduction and state properties assessed by the
same method receive no reduction, then [the
20% Statute] has created two classes of properties assessed by the cost appraisal method
and arbitrarily discriminated against one
class merely because it is a state-assessed
property. This disparity does not pass the
constitutional muster set out in Blue Cross.3
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah
1989) .
-5-

Indeed, there is no reasonable basis for the
classification of county properties assessed
by
the
cost
appraisal
method
versus
state-assessed properties assessed by similar
methods. The objectives of [the 20% Statute]
are not met when the same method is used for
both state and county assessments. (footnote
added).
Id. at 1261.
The same is true with Kennecott.

Because the capital-

ized net revenue method, in the Commission's opinion, did not
result in 100% of the fair market value of Kennecott's property,
the Commission did not employ that method.

Instead, the Commis-

sion used the same standard methods that the County used.

As in

Amax, there is no justification for treating Kennecott differently only because it is mining property.
III. DISTINCTIONS IN METHODOLOGIES EMPHASIZED BY THE
COMMISSION AND COUNTY ARE IMMATERIAL SINCE THE
COUNTY DEDUCTED 20% FROM ALL PROPERTY'S FAIR MARKET VALUE, REGARDLESS OF APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY.
Both the County and the Commission assert that had the
County assessed Kennecott's property,

it would have done the

assessment differently than did the Commission.
Commission at 12-13; Brief of County at 9-13.

See Brief of

They then conclude

this somehow demonstrates that Kennecott was not unlawfully discriminated

against

when

the

Commission

did

not

extend

to

Kennecott the 20% reduction for intangibles which was extended by
the County to all locally assessed real property.

-6-

The logic of this leap of faith escapes Kennecott.
facts are:

The

(1) the County granted a 20% reduction in value to

account for intangibles to all locally assessed real property,
regardless of the method employed to arrive at that property's
fair market value.

See Brief of Petitioner at 28-30; (2) the

Commission did not grant to Kennecott's property a similar 20%
value reduction to account for intangibles even though the methods employed to value Kennecott's property were identical to the
methods employed by the County to value many locally assessed
real properties to which the 20% reduction was granted; and
(3) by stipulation of all parties Kennecott's property, as of
January 1# 1988, was valued at 100% of that property's fair market value.4
See Brief of Petitioner at 27, citing Record at
203-04.
Therefore, by stipulation the parties have agreed that
Kennecott's property in 1988 was assessed at $617,771,073 and
that this sum represented the full fair market value of Kennecott7s property.

Additionally, the County has admitted that the

2 0% statute was applied to all county-assessed

4

real property

To be consistent, had the County assessed Kennecott's property and assigned a fair market value, which by stipulation is
the value assigned by the Commission as of January 1, 1988, the
County, in order to treat Kennecott's property the same as all
other locally assessed property, would have extended to Kennecott
a 20% reduction. This is exactly what Kennecott is seeking.
-7-

regardless of the valuation method used.

Consequently, the Coun-

ty's claim that it would have valued Kennecott's property using a
different methodology than that applied by the Commission is
irrelevant.
IV.

THE ALLOWANCE OF A 14% REDUCTION TO STATE-ASSESSED
RAILROAD PROPERTY BUT NOT TO KENNECOTT'S STATEASSESSED PROPERTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,

637 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that the uniform operation of
laws requirement of the Utah Constitution in Article I, Section
24, was substantially similar to the federal Equal Protection
Clause and that the Court's analysis under the Utah Constitutional provision was at least a rigorous as that required by the
federal Constitution.
The purpose of the uniform operation of laws requirement is to prevent the legislature from "classifying persons in
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law are treated differently by that law, to
the detriment of some of those so classified."

Id. at 637 citing

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752
P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988); see also Amax, 796 P.2d at 1261.
In this instance, Kennecott and the railroads are similarly situated because they are both centrally-assessed taxpayers
under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

59-2-201

-8-

(1987) .

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 59-2-201(1) (1987) requires that all centrally-assessed property be assessed by the Commission at 100% of fair market value.
Because of the Commission's reduction in the assessed value of
railroad property in 1988, however, Kennecott is assessed at 100%
of its value, while the railroads are assessed and taxed at only
5
86% of their property's value.
The County's brief asserts that the basic fallacy in
Kennecott's position is that Kennecott fails to recognize distinctions in property owners.

Brief of County at 14.

The Coun-

ty's brief cites Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County,
488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) as holding:

"Equal protection in the

context of taxation applies only to similarly situated property
owners."

Brief of County at 14. The County also cites Allegheny

Pittsburgh as establishing that "the equal protection clause does
not preclude a state from dividing different types of property
into classes and applying different tax rates to each class, so
long as the classifications and tax burdens are not designated in
an arbitrary and capricious manner."

Brief of County at 15-16.

The County's argument is fallacious.

The Utah Consti-

tution and Utah statute require the Commission to treat railroads

5

In 1988 by agreement with the railroads, the Commission
reduced the assessed value of the railroads' property by 14%. It
is Kennecott's understanding that this was done in order to comport with Juge Jenkins' decision in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Utah State Tax Commission. 716 F. Supp. 453 (D. Utah 1988).
-9-

and Kennecott in the same fashion.

Article XIII §§ 2 and 3 of

the Utah Constitution requires all tangible property to be taxed
at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value.

Utah

Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987) requires all centrally-assessed property to be assessed at 100% of fair market value.

Under the Utah

Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987), both Kennecott
and

the

railroads

centrally-assessed.

belong

to

the

same

class

of

taxpayers.

Thus, Kennecott and the railroads are simi-

larly situated taxpayers of the same class and the disparate
treatment between the railroads and Kennecott violates Kennecott' s rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution
and under Utah statute.
As this Court stated in Builders Components Supply Company v. Cockayne. 450 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah 1969),

"the only power

the assessor has to assess property is that delegated to him by
the legislature."

Here, the Commission has engaged in, and has

refused to remedy, an unlawful classification by assessing railroad property at 86% of fair market value, while assessing Kennecott1 s property

at 100% of its value.

6

Since both the Utah

The Builders Components Supply case has been recently cited
as precedent by this Court in County Board of Equalization v.
State Tax Commission. 789 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1990) and County
Board of Equalization v. Nupetco Associates, 779 P.2d 1138, 1139
(Utah 1989).
-10-

Constitution and Utah statute prohibit this classification, the
Commission may not so classify property and, instead, must equalize the valuation of Kennecott's property with that of the railroads .
The Commission,

on the other hand, argues that the

holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh is less relevant than the recent
case of Nordlinger v. Hahn,
7
L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)

U.S.
. .

, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120
.

which the Commission claims supports its argu-

ment that Kennecott may be forced to bear a larger tax burden as
long as the different treatment is related to a legitimate governmental interest.

Brief of Commission at 22-26.

Addition-

ally, , the Commission claims that the case cited by Kennecott,
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Egualizationf 443 N.W.2d 249
(Neb. 1989) relies upon outdated cases, while Federal Express
Corporation v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 717 S.W.2d
873 (Tenn. 1986) is more persuasive.

In Federal Express, the

court held that the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act ("4-R Act") preempted Tennessee#s classification of railroads
as utilities and required them to be taxed at the lower rate
applicable to industrial and commercial property.

The court

denied Federal Express' claim that the reduction in rate for the
7

Nordlinger was decided on June 18, 1992, the day after Kennecott7 s brief was filed. A copy of the case is included in the
Addendum.
-11-

railroads violated Federal Express' equal protection rights since
Federal Express was assessed as a utility.
Allegheny Pittsburgh and Northern Natural Gas are more
persuasive than Nordlinger and Federal Express.

In Allegheny

Pittsburgh, the Court ruled that Webster County's acquisition
value system

of taxation was unconstitutional because it was

inconsistent with West Virginia's constitutional and statutory
scheme requiring all property to be taxed at a uniform rate
throughout state according to its estimated value.

See 488 U.S.

at 345.
In Nordlinger, however, the Court ruled that California's acquisition value system of taxation, which was based on an
amendment to the State Constitution, was constitutional.

The

Nordlinger Court distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh because California's tax scheme was not designed to tax at a uniform rate
according to market value.
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA
cannot be distinguished from the tax assessment practice found to violate the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in
Allegheny Pittsburgh resulted in dramatic
disparities in taxation of properties of comparable value. But an obvious and critical
factual difference between this case and
8

An acquisition value system
erty based upon its most recent
properties may be assessed at
depending on when the properties

sets the assessed value of propsales price. Therefore, similar
substantially different values
were last sold.

-12-

Allegheny Pittsburgh is the absence of any
indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme could conceivably have been the
purpose for the Webster County tax assessor's
unequal assessment scheme.
In the first
place, Webster County argued that "its
assessment scheme is rationally related to
its purpose of assessing properties at true
current value" [emphasis added by the Court].
Id. . at 488 U.S., at 343 [footnote omitted].
Moreover, the West Virginia "Constitution and
laws provide that all property of the kind
held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate
uniform throughout the State according to its
estimated market value," and the Court found
"no suggestion" that "the State may have
adopted a different system in practice from
that specified by statute." Id., at 345.
60 U.S.L.W. at 4567.

Consequently, since Utah, by its Constitu-

tion and statutory scheme, in a fashion similar to West Virginia,
mandates taxation based upon a tax rate applied uniformly to the
fair market value of all property, the Allegheny Pittsburgh analysis is more persuasive.
Similarly, Northern Natural Gas is more persuasive than
Federal Express.

In Northern Natural Gas the court lowered the

petitioner's assessment to equalize it with the reduction granted
by the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
to railroads in order to comply with the 4-R Act.
Petitioner
requirement

at

40-42.

The basis

See Brief of

for this decision was the

in Nebraska's Constitution that taxes were to be

-13-

levied uniformly upon all tangible property.

See 443 N.W.2d at

255-56.9
In Federal Express, however, the court considered Tennessee's

Constitution

authorized

separate

property classifications for ad valorem tax purposes.

See 717

S.W.2d at 874.

which

specifically

Pursuant to that provision, Tennessee's law

required public utilities' property to be taxed at 55% of their
value while other commercial and industrial property was taxed at
30% of its value.

The court held that the District Court's

decision preempted the classification of railroads as utilities.
See id. at 876 (Congress, via the 4-R Act," preempted the state
classification of railroads as utilities and provided that they

9

Both the Commission's and County's attempts to distinguish
Northern Natural Gas are unsuccessful. The County states: "It
is important to note, however, that both the railroad and the
petitioner were public utilities, subject to federal law and having interstate connections." Brief of County at 20. This is not
a meaningful distinction identified as a factor in the case.
The Commission criticizes Northern Natural Gas for relying
upon outdated cases, for not citing Allegheny Pittsburgh, and for
not analyzing the legitimate purpose of the 4-R Act. The alleged
outdated cases, Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441
(1923) and Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918)
were both cited as precedents in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See 488
U.S. at 345. Additionally, the court in Northern Natural Gas had
no need to question or determine the legitimate purpose of the
4-R Act.
10

All other property, i.e. residential property, was taxed at
5% of its value. See id. The Tennessee Constitution did require
the taxation within each class to be uniform. See id.
-14-

should

be

taxed

as

industrial

and

commercial

property

are

taxed.")

Since Utah requires uniform taxation of all tangible
property according to its fair market value, Allegheny Pittsburgh
and Northern Natural Gas are more persuasive than Nordlinger and
Federal Express.

Based upon these decisions, Kennecott's prop-

erty should be equalized with the railroads requiring a 14%
reduction in the value of Kennecott's property.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Kennecott is entitled to:

(1) a

20% reduction in the assessed value of its real property as
granted in Amax; or in the alternative, (2) a 14% reduction in
assessed value of its real and personal property as was granted
to the railroads as a result of Union Pacific.
DATED this y^—day of September, 1992.

JAMES B. LEE
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
MAXWELL A. MILLER
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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1992:
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
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Bill Thomas Peters
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of September,

5] The United States

Extra Edition No. 1
Supreme Court
Opinions

Law Week
June 16, 1992

Volume 60. No. 49

THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. WASHINGTON, D.C.

OPINIONS ANNOUNCED JUNE 18,
The Supreme Court

decided:

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—Juries
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits
criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges on
basis of race; procedure set out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), for resolving defense claims that prosecution has
employed racially discriminatory peremptory challenges also
applies when such claims are raised by state in criminal trial.
(Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-372)
Page 4574

TAXATION—Corporate Income Tax
Iowa corporate income tax scheme that allows corporations to
take deduction for dividends received from domestic, but not
foreign, subsidiaries facially discriminates against foreign commerce in violation of Foreign Commerce Clause. (Kraft General
Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, No. 901918)
Page 4582

F u l l Text of O p i n i o n s
No. 90-1912

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH—Pre-emption

STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
KENNETH

Section 18(b) of Occupational Safety and Health Act, providing that states "shall" submit plan for federal approval if they
wish to "assume responsibility" for development and enforcement of occupational safety and health standards in area already
covered by federal standard, pre-empts all non-approved state
occupational safety and health standards relating to issue governed by federal standard; state law requirement that directly,
substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and
health is occupational safety and health standard within meaning of OSH Act, for purposes of pre-emption analysis, even if it
has additional purpose unrelated to occupational health and
safety. (Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, No. 90-1676)
. ' . . . . Page 4587

TAXATION—Property Taxes
California constitutional provision that bases real property
assessments on acquisition cost rather than current market
value, thereby disproportionately burdening recent purchasers of
real property and favoring longtime property owners in inflationary market, rationally furthers legitimate state interests in
preserving and stabilizing neighborhoods and in recognizing
longtime owners' greater reliance interests warranting protection
against higher taxes, and therefore does not violate Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; exemptions for homeowners over age 55 who exchange their principal residences and
for children who acquire property from their parents rationally
further legitimate state interest in encouraging stability of
ownership among these groups, and therefore do not violate
Equal Protection Clause; taxpayer who was California resident
before she acquired her property lacks standing to assert infringement of constitutional right to travel as basis for according
heightened scrutiny to her equal protection claim. (Nordlinger
v. Hahn, No. 90-1912)
Page 4563
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In response to rapidly rising real property taxes, California voters
approved a statewide ballot initiative, Proposition 13, which added
Article XIIIA to the State Constitution. Among other things, Article
XIIlA embodies an "acquisition value" system of taxation, whereby
property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon new
construction or a change in ownership. Exemptions from this reassessment provision exist for two types of transfers: exchanges of
principal residences by persons over the age of 55 and transfers
between parents and children. Over time, the acquisition-valud
system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons
owning similar pieces of property. Longer-term owners pay lower
taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay
higher taxes reflecting more recent values. Faced with such a
disparity, petitioner, a former Los Angeles apartment renter who had
recently purchased a house in Los Angeles County, filed suit against
respondents, the county and its tax assessor, claiming that Article
XIIlA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The County Superior Court dismissed
the complaint without leave to amend, and the State Court of Appeal
affirmed.
Held: Article XIIIA's acquisition-value assessment scheme does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
(a) Unless a state-imposed classification warrants some form of
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest.
(b) Petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as
a basis for heightened review of Article XIIIA. Her complaint does
not allege that she herself h a s been impeded from traveling or from
settling in California because, before purchasing her home, she
already lived in Los Angeles. Prudential standing principles prohibit-

NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washing—
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ing a litigant's raising another person's legal rights may not be
overlooked in this case, since petitioner has not identified any
obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California
from asserting claims on their own, nor shown any special relationship with those whose rights she seeks to assert.
(c) In permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than
newer owners of comparable property, Article XIIlA's assessment
scheme rationally furthers at least two legitimate state interests.
First, because the State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership
of homes and businesses. Second, the State legitimately can conclude
that a new owner, at the point of purchasing his property, does not
have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher
taxes as does an existing owner, who is already saddled with his
purchase and does not have the option of deciding not to buy his
home if taxes become prohibitively high.
(d) Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster, 488 U. S. 336, is not
controlling here, since the facts of that case precluded any plausible
inference that the purpose of the tax assessment practice there
invalidated was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax
scheme.
(e) Article XJIIA's two reassessment exemptions rationally further
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have
concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged
from exchanging their residences for ones more suitable to their
changing family sizes or incomes, and that the interests of family and
neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant
an exemption for transfers between parents and children.
(0 Because Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, this Court must
decline petitioner's request to invalidate it, even if it may appear to
be improvident and unwise yet unlikely ever to be reconsidered or
repealed by ordinary democratic processes.
25 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHN|U1ST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER,
J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II-A. THOMAS,
., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
tTEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1978, California voters staged what has been described
is a property tax revolt1 by approving a statewide ballot
nitiative known as Proposition 13. The adoption of
Voposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution
o impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is
axed and on the rate at which real property assessments
j*e increased from year to year. In this litigation, we
onsider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of
he Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real
property now is assessed under the California Constitution.
I
A
Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real
iroperty taxes in California. From fiscal years 1967-1968
o 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an
verage of 11.5 percent per year. See Report of the Senate
/Ommission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the
)alifornia State Senate 23 (1991). In response, the Califoria Legislature enacted several property tax relief meaures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972. Id., at 23-24.
'he boom in the State's real estate market persevered,
'See N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, p. 23, col. 1; Washington Post, June 11,
978. p. HI.
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however, and the median price of an existing home doubled
from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977. As a result, tax
levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing
assessment values. Id., at 23. Some homeowners saw thentax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing
any growth in their income and ability to pay. Id.t at 25.
See also Oakland, Proposition 13—Genesis and Consequences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979).
By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major
political issue in California. In only one month's time, tax
relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to
qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. See Lefcoe
& Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador
Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1978). On election
day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent
and carried 55 of the State's 58 counties. California
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement,
Primary Election, June 6, 1978, p. 39. California thus had
a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax
cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year. Senate
Commission Report, at 28. A California homeowner with a
$50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about
$750 per year in property taxes. Id, at 26.
As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the
California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a
property's "full cash value." § 1(a). "Full cash value" is
defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax
year or, "thereafter, the appraised value of real property
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment." §2(a). The
assessment "may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year." §2(b).
Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this
reassessment provision. One exemption authorizes the
legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell
their principal residences to carry their previous base-year
assessments with them to replacement residences of equal
or lesser value. §2(a). A second exemption applies to
transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of
other real property) between parents and children. § 2(h).
In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the
property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in
assessed valuations. The assessment limitation, however,
is subject to the exception that new construction or a
change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current
appraised value. Thus, the assessment provisions of Article
XIIIA essentially embody an "acquisition value" system of
taxation rather than the more commonplace "current value"
taxation. Real property is assessed at values related to the
value of the property at the time it is acquired by the
taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real
estate market.
Over time, this acquisition-value system has created
dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning
similar pieces of property. Property values in California
have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on
increases in assessments for property that is not newly
constructed or that has not changed hands. See Senate
Commission Report, at 31-32. As a result, longer-term
property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic
property values, while newer owners pay higher property
taxes reflecting more recent values. For that reason,
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Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a "welcome
stranger" system—the newcomer to an established community is "welcome" in anticipation that he will contribute a
larger percentage of support for local government than his
settled neighbor who owns a comparable home. Indeed, in
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering.
By 1989, the 44% of CaUfomia home owners who have
owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in
1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in
residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide.
Id., at 33. If property values continue to rise more than the
annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to
grow.
g
According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie
Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the
Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for
$170,000. App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just
two years before for $121,500. Id., at 6. Before her
purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los
Angeles and had not owned any real property in California.
Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12.
In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los
Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here,
informing her that her home had been reassessed upward
to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership. App. 7.
She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property
tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the
1988-1989 fiscal year. Ibid.
Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five
times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned
comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential
development. For example, one block away, a house of
identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner's was
subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an
assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home's
value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor).
Id., at 9-10. 2 According to petitioner, her total property
taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach
$19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable
home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100. Brief for Petitioner
3. The general tax levied against her modest home is only
a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a
$2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. App. 24.
After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner
brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles County
Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration
that her tax was unconstitutional.3 In her amended
complaint, she alleged: "Article XIIIA has created an
arbitrary system which assigns disparate real property tax

Petitioner proffered to the trial court additional evidence suggesting
that the disparities in residential tax burdens were greater in other Los
Angeles County neighborhoods. For example, a small 2-bedroom house
in Santa Monica that was previously assessed at $27,000 and that was
sold for $465,000 in 1989 would be subject to a tax levy of $4,650, a bill
17 times more than the $270 paid the year before by the previous owner.
App. 76-77. Petitioner also proffered evidence suggesting that similar
disparities obtained with respect to apartment buildings and commercial
and industrial income-producing properties. Id., at 68-69, 82-85.
California by statute grants a cause of action to a taxpayer "where the
alleged illegal or unconstitutional assessment or collection occurs as the
direct result of a change in administrative regulations or statutory or
constitutional law that became effective not more than 12 months prior
to the date the action is initiated by the taxpayer." Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code Ann. §4808 (West 1987). Although Proposition 13 was enacted 11
years before she filed her complaint, petitioner contended that the

burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly
situated properties without regard to the use of the real
property taxed, the burden the property places on government, the actual value of the property or the financial
capability of the property owner." Id., at 12. Respondents
demurred. W . , a t l 4 . By minute order, the Superior Court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint
without leave to amend. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Nordlinger v.
Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). It
noted that the Supreme Court of California already had
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in
taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal.3d 208,583 P.2d 1281 (1978). Characterizing Article
XIIIA as an "acquisition value" system, the Court of Appeal
found it survived equal protection review, because it was
supported by at least two rational bases: first, it prevented
property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unforeseen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners
to estimate future liability with substantial certainty. 225
Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing
Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 235, 583 P.2d, at 1293).
The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court's more
recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster
County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different
result. At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of
a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently
purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while
making only minor modifications in the assessments of
property that had not recently been sold. Properties that
had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values
between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been
sold. Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal
assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh
on grounds that "California has opted for an assessment
method based on each individual owner's acquisition cost,"
while, "[i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution
requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide
according to its estimated current market value" (emphasis
in original). 225 Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 695. Thus, the Court of Appeal found: "Allegheny does
not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value
assessment method. That decision merely prohibits the
arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment
method" (emphasis omitted). Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 686.
The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's argument
that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to
travel warranted heightened equal protection review. The
court determined that the right to travel was not infringed,
because Article XIIIA "bases each property owner's assessment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner's status
as a California resident or the owner's length of residence
in the state." Id., at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. Any
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed
"incidental" to an acquisition-value approach. Finally, the
Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the
exemptions in Article XIIIA. Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697.
The Supreme Court of California denied review. App. to
Pet. for Cert. Bl. We granted certiorari.
U. S.
(1991).
before petitioner filed her amended complaint. Because the California
L
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context of classifications made by complex tax laws. "[I]n
structuring
internal taxation schemes 'the States have large
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendleeway
in
making
classifications and drawing lines which
ment, §1, commands that no State shall "deny to any
in
their
judgment
produce
reasonable systems of taxation."
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
Williams
v.
Vermont,
472
U.S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting
laws." Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion
between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356,
does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmen- 359 (1973). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legislatures
tal decisionmakers from treating differently persons who
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and
are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co.
distinctions in tax statutes").
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does
As a general rule, "legislatures are presumed to have
not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
annual rate of adjustment in assessments. Newer and older
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality."
owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a
Accordingly, this Court's cases are clear that, unless a
2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and
classification warrants some form of heightened review
old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor
because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or
only—the basis on which their property is initially assessed.
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect character- Petitioner's true complaint is that the State has denied
istic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the her—a new owner—the benefit of the same assessment
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. value that her neighbors—older owners—enjoy.
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.
We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational
432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297,
or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that
303 (1976).
justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors*
lower assessments. First, the State has a legitimate
A
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and
At the outset, petitioner suggests that her challenge to stability. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its
infringes upon the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256 displacement of lower income families by the forces of
(1976). In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions gentrification or of established, "mom-and-pop" businesses
to reassessment for transfers by owners over 55 and for by newer chain operations. By permitting older owners to
transfers between parents and children run afoul of the pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of comparight to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of rable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme
California residency. But the complaint does not allege rationally furthers this interest.
that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new
from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior
owner
at the time of acquiring his property does not have
to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in
Los Angeles. This Court's prudential standing principles the same reliance interest warranting protection against
impose a "general prohibition on a litigant's raising another higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may
person's legal rights." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to "lock
1984). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. in" to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing
163, 166 (1972). Petitioner has not identified any obstacle owner of comparable property, because an existing owner
preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in
rom asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she his property or home that are more deserving of protection
shown any special relationship with those whose rights she than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the
>eeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential point of purchase. A new owner has full information about
imitation. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. the scope of future tax liability before acquiring the
517, 623, n. 3 (1989). Accordingly, petitioner may not property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too
issert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at
all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with
leightened review.
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet
B
his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to
The appropriate standard of review is whether the divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing,
lifference in treatment between newer and older owners and other necessities. In short, the State may decide that
ationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have
he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is owned at all.
L plausible policy reason for the classification, see United
This Court previously has acknowledged that classificaUates Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,174,
tions serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance
79 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification
interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.4 "The
s apparently based rationally may have been considered to
protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a
>e true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota
. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981), and
'Outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not
he relationship of the classification to its goal is not so hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expectattenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irratio- tion^ interests. See, e.g., Rakas v. IlUnois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978)
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legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceedingly persuasive justification. . . ." (internal quotations omitted). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984). For
example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S.
450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user
fees for bus service in "reorganized" school districts but not
in "nonreorganized" school districts does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, because "the legislature could
conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of those residing in districts with free busing arrangements imposed by reorganization plans." Id., at 465.
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual "windfall"
retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because
"Congress could properly conclude that persons who had
actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of
appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment
when they became eligible for dual benefits." 449 U. S., at
178. Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court
determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor
operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had
been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because the "city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have
built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation." 427 U. S., at 305.5
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distinguished from the tax assessment practice found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh
resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of
comparable value. But an obvious and critical factual
difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme
could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster
County tax assessor's unequal assessment scheme. In the
first place, Webster County argued that "its assessment
scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing
properties at true current value" (emphasis added). Id., at
488 U. S., at 343.6 Moreover, the West Virginia "Constituexpectation of privacy in the invaded place"); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (whether regulation
of property constitutes a "taking* depends in part on "the extent tn which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (state law
"property" interest for purpose of federal due process denotes "interests
that are secured by existing rules or understandings") (internal
quotations omitted).
*Because we conclude that Article XIIIA rationally furthers the State's
interests in neighborhood stability and the protection of property owners'
reliance interests, we need not consider whether it permissibly serves
other interests discussed by the parties, including whether it taxes real
property according to the taxpayers' ability to pay or whether it taxes
real property in such a way as to promote stability of local tax revenues.
6
Webster County argued that the outdated assessments it used were
consistent with current-value taxation, because periodic upward
adjustments were made for inflation and it was not feasible to reassess
individually each piece of property every year. Although the county
obliquely referred in a footnote to the advantages of historical cost
accounting. Bnef for Respondent in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Webster County. O.T. 1988, No. 87-1303, p. 30, n. 23, this was not an
assertion of the general policies supporting acquisition-value taxation,
hven if acquisition-value policies had been asserted, the assertion would
have been nonsensical given its inherent inconsistency with the county's
principal argument that it was m fact trying to promote current-value

tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the
State according to its estimated market value," and the
Court found "no suggestion" that "the State may have
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by
statute." Id., at 345.
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand
for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or
governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the
purpose or rationale supporting its classification. United
Stades Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179.
See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative
history is silent). Nevertheless, this Court's review does
require that a purpose may conceivably or "may reasonably
have been the purpose and policy" of the relevant governmental decisionmaker. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959). See also Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme
must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective" (emphasis added)). Allegheny
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisitionvalue tax scheme.7 By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted
precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value
system. Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here.8
Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article
XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment
for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and
older, who exchange principal residences, and children who
acquire property from their parents. This Court previously
has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general
scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme
invidiously discriminatory. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. at 550-551
(denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations,
but with an exception for veterans' groups, does not violate
equal protection). For purposes of rational-basis review, the
"latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of
partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy." F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415.
The two exemptions at issue here rationally further
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably
could have concluded that older persons in general should
not be discouraged from moving to a residence more
suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly,
7
In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), the
Court distinguished on similar grounds its decision in Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U . S . 562 (1949), which invalidated a state
statutory scheme exempting from taxation certain notes and accounts
receivable owned by residents of the State but not notes and accounts
receivable owned by nonresidents. 358 U. S., at 529. Alter the Court in
Wheeling Steel determined that the statutory scheme's stated purpose
was not legitimate, the other purposes did not need to be considered
because *Thjaving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio
statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence."
Id, at 530.
8
In finding Allegheny Pittsburgh distinguishable, we do not suggest
that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are any less when the
classification is drawn by legislative mandate, as in this case, than by
administrative action as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918). Nor do we suggest that the
Equal Protection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny
Pittsburgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation of
property. See Nashville. C. & St. L R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362,
368-370 (1940); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264
U. S. 22, 27-28 (1924). See generally Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1,
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the people of California reasonably could have concluded
that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity
and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for
transfers between parents and children. Petitioner has not
demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these
exemptions.
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XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 2. The property tax system
worked much the same way in Webster County, West
Virginia. The tax assessor assigned real property an
"appraised value," set the "assessed value" at half of the
appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the
assessed value by the relevant tax rate. For property that
had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value
Ill
at the most recent price of purchase. For property that had
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by
XIIIA frustrates the "American dream" of home ownership 10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983.
for many younger and poorer California families. They
l ne assessor's methods resulted in "dramatic differences
argue that Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that
in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and
depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage
otherwise comparable surrounding land." 488 U. S., at 341;
in competing with established businesses. They argue that
cf. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash.
Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new
L. Rev. 261, 269-270 (1990) (discussing the effects of
housing and buildings. And they argue that Article XIIIA
Proposition 13); Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public
Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County
education and vital services.
Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 91, and n. 29 (1990);
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in
Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
the rational-basis context that the "Constitution presumes
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 306,
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi308-310 (1989). Several coal companies that owned
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
property in Webster County sued the county assessor,
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwaralleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United
ranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
branch has acted" (footnote omitted). Vance v. Bradley, 440
West Virginia upheld the assessment against the compaU. S. 93, 97 (1979). Certainly, California's grand experinies, but this Court reversed.
ment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with
entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal
respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains
surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to
the States as follows. Although "|t]he use of a general
prompt its reconsideration or repeal. See 225 Cal. App. 3d,
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual
at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11. Yet many wise
reappraisal violates no constitutional command," the Clause
and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady.
requires that "general adjustments [be] accurate enough
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of
proportion between the assessments of a class of property
California.
holders." 488 U. S., at 343. "[T]he constitutional requireThe judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
ment is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in
It is so ordered. tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." Ibid.
(citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522,
526-527 (1959)). Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitution and laws of West Virginia "provide that all property of
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform
the judgment.
throughout the State according to its estimated market
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission value," and "[t]here [was] no suggestion . . . that the State
of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), this Court struck may have adopted a different system in practice from that
down an assessment method used in Webster County, West specified by statute." 488 U. S., at 345. "Indeed, [the
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide
California scheme being challenged today. I agree with the published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid
Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional. But I also agree to local assessors in the assessment of real property." Ibid.;
with JUSTICE STEVENS that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be see also ibid. ("We are not advised of any West Virginia
distinguished, see post, at 5. lb me Allegheny Pittsburgh statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of
•epresents a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the State to fashion their own substantive assessment
he State's legislative powers," New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 policies independently of state statute"). The Court refused
J. S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), and I write separately to decide "whether the Webster County assessment method
>ecause I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational
onfront it directly.
enforcement policy it appears to be." Id., at 344, n. 4.
I
Finally, the Court declared, "*[IIntentional systematic
Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property
cheme indistinguishable in relevant respects from Proposi- in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one
ion 13. As the Court explains, California taxes real taxed upon the full value of his property.'" Id., at 345
iroperty at 19b of "full cash value," which means the (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
assessed value" as of 1975 (under the previous method) 352-353 (1918), and citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
nd after 1975-1976 the "appraised value of real property County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Cumberland Coal Co. v.
/hen purchased, newly constructed, or a change in value Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Green County, Pa.,
284 U. S. 23 (1931)). The Court concluded that the assessias occurred after the 1975 assessment." The assessed
ments for the coal companies' Dronprtip* haH failpH tHpc*
alue may be increased for inflation, but only at a maxi-
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classifying property. But the Equal Protection Clause does
II
not prescribe a single method of taxation. We have consisAs the Court accurately states today, "this Court's cases" tently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g., Ohio Oil Co. v.
Allegheny Pittsburgh aside—"are clear that, unless a Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylclassification warrants some form of heightened review vania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890), and the Court properly rejects
because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right it today.
or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characAllegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of
teristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the California from classifying properties on the basis of their
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." value at acquisition, so long as the classification is supportAnte, at 7; see also Burlington N. R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U. S. ed by a rational basis. I agree with the Court that it is,
(1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 9-12,
t
410 U, S. 356, 359 (1973). The California tax system, like and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of Califormost, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental nia in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classifi- State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281
cation for a rational basis. Today's review, however, differs (1978). But the classification employed by the Webster
from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh.
County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was
The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is suscepti- rational for all those reasons as well. In answering
ble, I think, to at least three interpretations. The first is petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls
the one offered by petitioner. Under her reading of the
here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case.
case, properties are "similarly situated" or within the same
JUSTICE STEVENS gives much the same explanation, see
"class" for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
post, at 4-5, though he concludes in the end that Proposiwhen they are located in roughly the same types of neightion 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional.
borhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are
According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause
roughly the same in other, unspecified ways. According to
permits a State itself to determine which properties are
petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the
similarly situated, as the State of California did here
Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve
(classifying
properties by acquisition value) and as the State
a "seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatof
West
Virginia
did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying
ment" of all the objectively comparable properties in
properties
by
market
value). But once a state does so,
Webster County, presumably those with about the same
respondents
suggest,
the
Equal Protection Clause requires
acreage and about the same amount of coal. Petitioner
contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws. In after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class
1989, she points out, "the long-time owner of a stately be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be inten7,800-square-foot, seven-bedroom mansion on a huge lot in tionally and systematically undervalued. Proposition 13
Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of provides for the assessment of properties in the same statethe most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County) determined class regularly and at roughly full value; this
. . . paid less property tax annually than the new homeown- contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by
er of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an dividing property in the same class (by market value) into
extremely modest Venice neighborhood." Brief for Peti- a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly
tioner 5; see also id., at 7 (Petitioner s "1988 property tax undervalued the property similarly situated. This, accordassessment on her unpretentious Baldwin Hills tract home in? to respondents, made the Webster County scheme
is almost identical to that of a pre-1976 owner of a fabulous unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13.
Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my
beach-front Malibu residential property worth $2.1 million,
even though her property is worth only l/12th as much as view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters,
his"). Because California not only has not tried to repair comes with a dubious pedigree. In one of the cases cited in
this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation, Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against
but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues, an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some
corporations from ad valorem taxes imposed on others. Not
Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution
This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunder- "require[s] . . . the seasonable attainment of a rough
standing of Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court there proceed- equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property
ed on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties owners," 488 U. S., at 343, we took pains there to stress a
did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the very different proposition:
State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact
"The States have very wide discretion in the laying of
(assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the
their taxes. . . . Of course, the States, in the exercise of
properties were comparable under the State's classification.
their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of
But cf. Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 271-272 (noting
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendthat some of the properties contained coal and others did
not). In referring to the tax treatment of a "class of
ment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality,
property holders," or "similarly situated property owners,"
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropri488 U. S., at 343, the Court did not purport to review the
ate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State
constitutionality of the initial classification, by market
. . . is not required to resort to close distinctions or to
value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further
maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference
subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition
to composition, use or value." Allied Stores, 358 U. S.,
value, drawn by the assessor. Instead, Allegheny Pittsat 526-527.
burgh assumed that whether properties or persons are
similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh,
petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected
location that serve as proxies for market value. Under that equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed.
o~...-™ A T M n Aoc„ v AJHpraon. 324 U. S. 182 (1945),
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and the case in which the words intentional, systematic,
and undervaluation first appeared, Coulter v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 609 (1905), did not explain
where the test came from or why.
It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike
down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in
Allegheny Pittsburgh. Cumberland Coal, however, reflects
the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading
of Allegheny Pittsburgh. As respondents understand these
two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for "the
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment"
or if it results in "intentional systematic undervaluation'"
of properties similarly situated by state law, 488 U. S., at
343, 345. This would be so regardless of whether the
inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in
Webster County) from further classifications of properties
within a class, is supported by a rational basis. But not
since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence
lias this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state
representatives with its own notions of "rough equality,"
'undervaluation," or "fairness." Cumberland Coal, which
ails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with
>ur current caselaw. Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my
riew, mean to return us to the era when this Court someimes second-guessed state tax officials. In rejecting today
espondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as
understand it, agrees.
This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny
Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court. The Court
iroceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protecion framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind
iiscredited, gloss to rational-basis review. The Court
oncedes that the "Equal Protection Clause does not
emand for purposes of rational-basis review that a
»gislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate
t any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifiation." Ante, at 13 (citing United States Railroad Retiretent Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,179 (1980)). This principle
pplies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial
lassi6cation but to all further classifications within a class.
Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a
urpose may conceivably or 'may reasonably have been the
urpose and policy' of the relevant governmental decisionlaker," the Court says, ante, at 13 (quoting A Hied Stores,
ipra, at 528-529), and uAllegheny Pittsburgh was the rare
isc where the facts precluded any plausible inference that
ic reason for the unequal assessment practice was to
:hieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme,"
itc, at 13. Rather than obeying the "law of a State,
>nerally applied," the county assessor had administered an
iberrational enforcement policy," 488 U. S., at 344, n. 4.
?e ante, at 13. According to the Court, therefore, the
•oblem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster
3unty scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational
jcause it was contrary to state law. Any rational bases
iderlying the acquisition-value scheme were "implausible"
r "unreasonable") because they were made so by the Conitution and laws of the State of West Virginia.
That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in
nsion with settled case law. Even if the assessor did
olate West Virginia law (and that she did is open to
testion, see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida
W. Va.
,
, 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564
)al Co.,
987)), she would not have violated the Equal Protection
ause. A violation of state law does not by itself constitute
E o l a t i o n of t h e F p f W f l l P.nnRtit.iitinn
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in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), for instance,
where a candidate for state office complained that members
of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his
name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating
an Illinois statute. Because the plaintiff had not alleged,
say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against
him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to
comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the
defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
"[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws,
even though the denial of the right to one person may
operate to confer it on another.. . . [Wlhere the official
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of
the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute,
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of
the laws." Id., at 8.
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362(1940).
The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden,
see ante, at 14, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain.
For if, as the Court suggests, what made the assessor's
method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state
law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh
recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier
rejected. See Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 268-269;
Cohen, 38 UCLA L. Rev, at 93-94; Ely, Another Spin on
Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 108-109
(1990). In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court
threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth
Amendment but of the Eleventh. We have held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering
state actors to conform to the dictates of state law.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U. S. 89 (1984). After today, however, a plaintiff might be
able invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey
state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state
law appears to have become a claim that he has violated
the Constitution. See Cohen, supra, at 103; Ely, supra, at
109-110 ("[B]y the Court's logic, all violations of state
law—at least those violations that end (as most do) in the
treatment of some people better than others—are theoretically convertible into violations of the Equal Protection
Clause").
I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish
Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has
left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray. The
analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward. Unless
a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental
rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
demands only a conceivable rational basis for the challenged state distinction. See Fritz, supra; Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U. S. 662,
702-706, and n. 13 (1981 )(REHNQU1ST, J., dissenting). This
basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact,
States need not articulate any reasons at all for their
actions. See ibid. Proposition 13, 1 believe, satisfies this
standard—but so, for the same reasons, did the scheme
employed in Webster County. See Brief for Pacific Legal
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13,
Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Commfn of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos.
fi7_1QHQ
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appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder,
though, about its legacy.
*
*
*
I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part II-A
of its opinion.

JUSTICE STEVENS,

dissenting.

young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on
their parents' date of acquisition even though both
homes are of identical value. Not only does this
constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax
treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it appears to favor the housing needs of children with homeowner-parents over children with non-homeownerparents. With the repeal of the state's gift and inheritance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is
negligible." Commission Report, at 9-10.

During the two past decades, California property owners
have enjoyed extraordinary prosperity. As the State's The Commission was too generous. To my mind, the
population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real rationale for such disparity is not merely "negligible," it is
estate. Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a
value of California property subject to property taxation medieval character: Two families with equal needs and
increased tenfold.1 Simply put, those who invested in equal resources are treated differently solely because of
California real estate in the 1970s are among the most their different heritage.
fortunate capitalists in the world.
In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly
Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors situated taxpayers is arbitrary and unreasonable. Although
with a tremendous windfall and, in doing so, has created the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, see ante,
severe inequities in California's property tax scheme.
at 4, n. 2, its analysis of the justification for those inequities
These property owners (hereinafter "the Squires") are consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue
guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and to long-time property owners. That a law benefits those it
do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than benefits cannot be an adequate justification for severe
2% in any given year. As a direct result of this windfall for inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13.
the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than thenI
fair share of property taxes.
The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to chalThe standard by which we review equal protection
lenge the constitutionality of Proposition 13 is the fact that challenges to state tax regimes is well-established and
her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as properly deferential. "Where taxation is concerned and no
that of her neighbors who own comparable homes: While specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is
her neighbors' 1989 taxes averaged less than $400, petition- imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifier was taxed $1,700. App. 18-20. This disparity is not cations and drawing lines which in their judgment produce
unusual under Proposition 13. Indeed, some homeowners reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). Thus, as the
comparable property. See id., at 76-77. For vacant land, Court today notes, the issue in this case is "whether the
the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1. App. to Pet. for difference in treatment between newer and older owners
Cert. A7. Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, at 8.3
of commercial property as well as residential property, the
But deference is not abdication and "rational basis
regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the scrutiny" is still scrutiny. Thus we have, on several recent
Squires, placing new businesses at a substantial disadvan- occasions, invalidated tax schemes under such a standard
tage.
of review. See e. g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44% ComvrCn of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989); Hooper v.
of the owner-occupied residences, paid only 25% of the total Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985);
taxes collected from homeowners in 1989. Report of Senate Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams,
California State Senate 33 (1991) (Commission Report). 457 U.S. 55,60-61(1982).
These disparities are aggravated by § 2 of Proposition 13,
Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated
which exempts from reappraisal a property owner's home Webster County, West Virginia's assessment scheme under
and up to $1 million of other real property when that rational-basis scrutiny. Webster County employed a de
property is transferred to a child of the owner. This facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The County
exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely, assessed recently purchased property on the basis of its
allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from purchase price but made only occasional adjustments
generation to generation. As the California Senate Com- (averaging 3-4% per year) to the assessments of other
mission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue observed:
properties. Just as in this case, "[t]his approach systematiThe inequity is clear. One young family buys a new cally produced dramatic differences in valuation between
home and is assessed at full market value. Another . . . recently transferred property and otherwise comparable
surrounding land." Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 341.
The "*[i]ntentional systematic undervaluation/" id,, at
'Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261, 345, found constitutionally infirm in Allegheny Pittsburgh
270, n. 49 (1990). Tor the same period, {property values ml Hawaii rose
approximately 450%; Washington, D.C. approximately 350%; and New
York approximately 125%." Ibid, (citing 2 U. S. Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 86-111, Table 12 (1987); 2
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values
and AssessmentfSales Price Ratios 42, Table 2 (1977)).
2
Proposition 13 was codified as Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution; for convenience sake, however, I refer to it by its colloquial

3
As the Court notes, ante, at 8, petitioner contends that Proposition 13
infringes on the constitutional right to travel and that, accordingly, a
more searching standard of review is appropriate. There is no need U
address that issue because the gross disparities created by Pro posit) or
13 do not pass even the most deferential standard of review. Cf. Hoopei
v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U . S . 612, 618 (1985); Zobel v
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982).
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has been codified in California by Proposition 13. That the
discrimination in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the
discrimination in this case de jure makes little difference.
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents" Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
352-353 (1918) (emphasis added). If anything, the inequality created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more
problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy
rather than the result of an individual assessor's maladministration.
Nor can Allegheny Pittsburgh be distinguished because
West Virginia law established a market-value assessment
regime. Webster County's scheme was constitutionally
invalid not because it was a departure from state law, but
because it involved the relative "'systematic undervaluation
. . . [of] property in the same class'" (as that class was
defined by state law). Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at
345 (emphasis added). Our decisions have established that
the Equal Protection Clause is offended as much by the
arbitrary delineation of classes of property (as in this case)
as by the arbitrary treatment of properties within the same
class (as in Allegheny Pittsburgh). See Brown Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910); Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23, 28-30 (1931). Thus,
if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was
sound—and I remain convinced that it was—it follows
inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County's
?issessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide discrimination is far more
invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax disparity.
The States, of course, have broad power to classify
property in their taxing schemes and if the "classification is
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no
lenial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman
Zo. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S., at 573. As we stated in Allegheny Pittsburgh, a "State may divide different kinds of
>roperty into classes and assign to each class a different tax
furden so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonible." 488 U. S., at 344.
Consistent with this standard, the Court has long upheld
ax classes based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, see, e.g.,
'ox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 101
1935); the nature (tangible or intangible) of the property,
ee, e.g., Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Superviirs, 282 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1930); the use of the property,
3e, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114 (1900); and
le status (corporate or individual) of the property owner,
se, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
. S. 356 (1973). Proposition 13 employs none of these
imiliar classifications. Instead it classifies property based
I its nominal purchase price: All property purchased for
le same price is taxed the same amount (leaving aside the
7c annual adjustment). That this scheme can be named
n "acquisition value" system) does not render it any less
•bitrary or unreasonable. Under Proposition 13, a
ajestic estate purchased for $150,000 in 1975 (and now
orth more than $2 million) is placed in the same tax class
; a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000. The
dy feature those two properties have in common is that
me where, sometime a sale contract for each was executed
at contained the nrirp "fcisnnnn" Po^i«»i—1» : - —

environment of phenomenal real property appreciation, to
classify property based on its purchase price is "palpably
arbitrary." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S
522,530(1959).
II
Under contemporary equal protection doctrine, the test of
whether a classification is arbitrary is "whether the
difference in treatment between [earlier and later purchasers] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante,
at 8. The adjectives and adverbs in this standard are more
important than the nouns and verbs.
A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests
of members of the disadvantaged class and the community
at large as well as the direct interests of the members of
the favored class. It must have a purpose or goal independent of the direct effect of the legislation and one "'that we
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature.'" Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U. S. 432,452, n. 4 (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (quoting
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S.
166,180-181 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)).
That a classification must find justification outside itself
saves judicial review of such classifications from becoming
an exercise in tautological reasoning.
"A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by
observing that in light of the statutory classification all
those within the burdened class are similarly situated.
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences;
it cannot create new ones that are supported by only
their own bootstraps. 'The Equal Protection Clause
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory
application within the class it establishes.' Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966)." Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 27 (1985).
If the goal of the discriminatory classification is not
independent from the policy itself, "each choice [of classification] will import its own goal, each goal will count as
acceptable, and the requirement of a rational' choice-goal
relation will be satisfied by the very making of the choice."
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1247 (1970).
A classification rationally furthers a state interest when
there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the
legislative purpose. As noted above, in the review of tax
statutes we have allowed such fit to be generous and
approximate, recognizing that "rational distinctions may be
made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976).
Nonetheless, in some cases the underinclusiveness or the
overinclusiveness of a classification will be so severe that it
cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally
furthers" the posited state interest.4 See, e.g., Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 636-638 (1974).
The Court's cursory analysis of Proposition 13 pays little
attention to either of these aspects of the controlling
standard of review. The first state interest identified by the
Court is California's "interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability." Ante, at 9 (citing Euclid
4

"Herod, ordering the death of all male children born on a particular
day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall,
employed such a[n ovennclusive] classification!, as did tjhe wartime
treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry (which imposed!
burdens upon a large class of individuals because some of them were
believed to be disloyal." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
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v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)). It is beyond
question that "inhibiting the] displacement of lower income
families by the forces of gentnfication," ante, at 9-10, is a
legitimate state interest; the central issue is whether the
disparate treatment of earlier and later purchasers rationally furthers this goal. Here the Court offers not an
analysis, but only a conclusion: "By permitting older owners
to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of
comparable property, [Proposition 13] rationally furthers
this interest." Ante, at 10.
I disagree. In my opinion, Proposition 13 sweeps too
broadly and operates too indiscriminately to "rationally
further" the State's interest in neighborhood preservation.
No doubt there are some early purchasers living on fixed or
limited incomes who could not afford to pay higher taxes
and still maintain their homes. California has enacted
special legislation to respond to their plight.5 Those
concerns cannot provide an adequate justification for
Proposition 13. A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall
for all property owners and their descendants is no more a
"rational" means for protecting this small subgroup than a
blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith would
be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill.
Even within densely populated Los Angeles County,
residential property comprises less than half of the market
value of the property tax roll. App. 45. It cannot be said
that the legitimate state interest in preserving neighborhood character is "rationally furthered" by tax benefits for
owners of commercial, industrial, vacant, and other nonresidential properties.6 It is just short of absurd to conclude
that the legitimate state interest in protecting a relatively
small number of economically vulnerable families is
"rationally furthered" by a tax windfall for all 9,787,887
property owners7 in California.
The Court's conclusion is unsound not only because of the
lack of numerical fit between the posited state interest and
Proposition 13's inequities but also because of the lack of
logical fit between ends and means. Although the State
may have a valid interest in preserving some neighborhoods,8 Proposition 13 not only "inhibitfs the] displace5
As pointed out in the Commission Report, California has addressed
this specific problem with specific legislation. The State has established
two programs:
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides refunds of up to
ninety-six percent of property taxes to low income homeowners over age
62.

"Senior Citizens Property Tax Postponement. Allows senior citizens with
incomes under $20,000 to postpone all or part of the taxes on their homes
until an ownership change occurs." Commission Report 23.
6
The Court's rationale for upholding Proposition 13 does not even
arguably apply to vacant property. That, as the Court recognizes,
Proposition 13 discourages changes of ownership means that the law
creates an impediment to the transfer and development of such property
no matter now socially desirable its improvement might be. It is equally
plain that the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Squires who own
commercial property is wholly unjustified. There is no rational state
interest in providing those entrepreneurs with a special privilege that
tends to discourage otherwise desirable transfers of income-producing
property. In a free economy, the entry of new competitors should be
encouraged, not arbitrarily hampered by unfavorable tax treatment.
Brief for California Assessors' Association as Amicus Curiae 2.
•The ambiguous character of this interest is illustrated by the options
faced by a married couple that owns a three- or four-bedroom home that
suited their family needs while their children lived at home. After the
children have moved out, increased taxes and maintenance expenses
would—absent Proposition 13—tend to motivate the sale of the home to
a voun^er fanrrilv neprimcr a Knmo «f *Vio* d < . «- M«..u«.«~ *i
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ment" of settled families, it also inhibits the transfer of
unimproved land, abandoned buildings, and substandard
uses. Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, Proposition
13 is not like a zoning system. A zoning system functions
by recognizing different uses of property and treating those
different uses differently. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S., at 388-390. Proposition 13 treats all property
alike, giving all owners tax breaks, and discouraging the
transfer or improvement of all property—the developed and
the dilapidated, the neighborly and the nuisance.
In short, although I agree with the Court that "neighborhood preservation" is a legitimate state interest, I cannot
agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased
property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest. To
my mind, Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish
such a specialized goal. The severe inequalities created by
Proposition 13 cannot be justified by such an interest.9
The second state interest identified by the Court is the
"reliance interests" of the earlier purchasers. Here I find
the Court's reasoning difficult to follow. Although the
protection of reasonable reliance interests is a legitimate
governmental purpose, see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S.
728, 746 (1984), this case does not implicate such interests.
A reliance interest is created when an individual justifiably
acts under the assumption that an existing legal condition
will persist; thus reliance interests are most often implicated when the government provides some benefit and then
acts to eliminate the benefit. See, e.g., New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). In this case, those who
purchased property before Proposition 13 was enacted
received no assurances that assessments would only
increase at a limited rate; indeed, to the contrary, many
purchased property in the hope that property values (and
assessments) would appreciate substantially and quickly.
It cannot be said, therefore, that the earlier purchasers of
property somehow have a reliance interest in limited tax
increases.
Perhaps what the Court means is that post-Proposition
13 purchasers have less reliance interests than pre-Proposition 13 purchasers. The Court reasons that the State may
tax earlier and later purchasers differently because
"an existing owner rationally may be thought to have
vested expectations in his property or home that are
more deserving of protection than the anticipatory
expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase.
A new owner has full information about the scope of
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and
if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he
can decide not to complete the purchase at all. By
contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his
purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to

13, however, subsidizes the wasteful retention of unused housing
capacity, making the sale of the home unwise and the rental of the extra
space unnecessary.
•Respondent contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are
justified by the State's interest in protecting property owners from
taxation on unrealized appreciation. The California Supreme Court
relied on a similar state interest. See Amador Valley Joint Union High
School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 236-238, 583
P. 2d 1281, 1309-1311 (1978). This argument is closely related to the
Court's-reasoning concerning "neighborhood preservation"; respondent
claims the State has an interest in preventing the situation in which
"skyrocketing real estate prices . . . dnvfe} property taxes beyond some
taxpayers' ability to pay." Bnef for Respondent 19. As demonstrated
above, whatever the connection between acquisition price and "ability to
pay," a blanket tax windfall for all early purchasers of property (and
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buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high." Ante,
at 10. ,0
This simply restates the effects of Proposition 13. A preProposition 13 owner has "vested expectations" in reduced
taxes only because Proposition 13 gave her such expectations; a later purchaser has no such expectations because
Proposition 13 does not provide her such expectations. But
the same can be said of any arbitrary protection for an
existing class of taxpayers. Consider a law that establishes
that homes with even street numbers would be taxed at
twice the rate of homes with odd street numbers. It is
certainly true that the even-numbered homeowners could
not decide to "unpurchase" their homes and that those
considering buying an even-numbered home would know
that it came with an extra tax burden, but certainly that
would not justify the arbitrary imposition of disparate tax
burdens based on house numbers. So it is in this case.
Proposition 13 provides a benefit for earlier purchasers and
imposes a burden on later purchasers. To say that the later
purchasers know what they are getting into does not
answer the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitutional to tax early purchasers less than late purchasers
when at the time of taxation their properties are comparable? This question the Court does not answer.
Distilled to its essence, the Court seems to be saying that
earlier purchasers can benefit under Proposition 13 because
earlier purchasers benefit under Proposition 13. If, however, a law creates a disparity, the State's interest preserving
that disparity cannot be a "legitimate state interest"
justifying that inequity. As noted above, a statute's
disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct
from the very effects created by that statute. Thus, I
disagree with the Court that the severe inequities wrought
by Proposition 13 can be justified by what the Court calls
the "reliance interests" of those who benefit from that
scheme.11
In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated
persons differently on the basis of the date they joined the
class of property owners. Until today, I would have thought
this proposition far from controversial. In Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), we ruled that Alaska's program
of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient's
years of residency in the State violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court wrote:
"If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of residence, what would
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale
based on years of residence—or even limiting access of
finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for
civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length
of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based
on length of residence! Alaska's reasoning could open
the door to state apportionment of other rights, bene-
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fits, and services according to length of residency. It
would permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result
would be clearly impermissible." Id., at 64 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds New Mexico's policy of providing a permanent tax
exemption for Vietnam veterans who had been state
residents before May 8, 1976, but not to more recent
arrivals. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S.
612 (1985). The Court expressly rejected the State's claim
that it had a legitimate interest in providing special
rewards to veterans who lived in the State before 1976 and
concluded that a [n]either the Equal Protection Clause, nor
this Court's precedents, permit the State to prefer established resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive
apportionment of an economic benefit.* Id., at 623.
As these decisions demonstrate, the selective provision of
benefits based on the timing of one's membership in a class
(whether that class be the class of residents or the class of
property owners) is rarely a legitimate state interest."
Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share
in the benefits of local government. It would obviously be
unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or
police protection than the other; it is just as plainly
unconstitutional to require one to pay five times as much in
property taxes as the other for the same government
services. In my opinion, the severe inequahties created by
Proposition 13 are arbitrary and unreasonable and do not
rationally further a legitimate state interest.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
CARLYLE W. HALL JR., Los Angeles, Calif. (MARY LOUISE
COHEN, ANN E. CARLSON, ELIZA VORENBERG, and HALL
& PHILLIPS, on the briefs) for petitioner; REX E. LEE, Provo, Utah
(CARTER G. PHILLIPS, MARK D. HOPSON, CHRISTOPHER
R. DRAHOZAL, SIDLEY & AUSTIN, DEWITT W. CLINTON,
RAYMOND G. FORTNER JR., LAWRENCE B. LAUNER, DAVID L. MU1R, and ALBERT RAMSEYER, on the briefs) for
respondents.
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'"The Court's sympathetic reference to "existing ownerfs] already
saddled" with their property should not obscure the fact that these early
purchasers have already seen their property increase in value more than
tenfold.
"Respondent, drawing on the analysis of the California Supreme
Court, contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are also
justified by the State's interest in "permitting the taxpayer to make more
careful and accurate predictions of future tax liability." Amador Valley,
22 Cal.3d, at 239, 583 P. 2d, at 1312. This analysis suffers from the
same infirmity as the Court's "reliance" analysis. I agree that Proposition 13 permits greater predictability of tax liability; the relevant
question, however, is whether the inequities between earlier and later
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Respondents, who are white, were charged with assaulting two AfricanAmericans. Before jury selection began, the trial judge denied the
prosecution's motion to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U. S.
—in which this Court held that private
litigants cannot exercise peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner—on the ground that it involved civil litigants rather
than criminal defendants.
Held: The Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging
in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges,
(a) The exercise of raciallv discriminatory peremptory challenges

